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RESUMEN
En 1438 Pedro, duque de Coimbra, era el segundo en la línea de sucesión 
al trono portugués. La muerte de su hermano mayor Duarte había dejado la 
corona vacante y Pedro, un poderoso magnate de mediana edad fue elegido 
como regente del hijo de Duarte, Alfonso, el niño de seis años sobre quien 
recaía el reinado. Primero como corregente y después en solitario, Pedro 
gobernó Portugal y sus élites durante una década marcada a veces por la 
satisfacción y a veces por la agitación, así como por las luchas cortesanas 
entre facciones aristocráticas. En 1449, entre acusaciones de lesa majestad 
y de favorecer a su propia persona, Pedro encontraría un amargo final en el 
campo de batalla, a manos de su joven sobrino, el rey Alfonso V, al parecer 
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manipulado por una influente camarilla de enemigos del regente. El artículo 
examinará la actuación de Pedro de Coimbra y de algunos de sus hombres 
durante su carrera política (c. 1416-1449), particularmente la de aquellos 
empleados como «diplomáticos» en el extranjero. Se trazarán tres etapas 
diferentes en la trayectoria de Pedro –como infante, como consejero del rey y 
finalmente como regente del reino portugués– para conocer hasta qué punto 
un magnate destacado del siglo XV podía proyectar su influencia política 
en colaboración, o contra, el poder real. Finalmente, el artículo destaca la 
coexistencia, y también la superposición, entre las ambiciones diplomáticas 
reales y no reales y las tensiones y desafíos que causaban en la política y la 
diplomacia de Portugal durante dicho período.
Palabras clave: Diplomacia; Cultura política; Aristocracia; Portugal en la 
edad media; Soberanía.
ABSTRACT
In 1438 Pedro, Duke of Coimbra, was second-in-line to the Portuguese 
throne. The death of his elder brother Duarte had left the royal seat vacant 
and Pedro, a middle-aged, powerful magnate was elected as regent for 
Duarte’s son Afonso, the boy of six to whom the crown fell. First as the co-
regent and then single-handedly, Pedro governed over Portugal and its elites 
during a decade marked in turn by contentment and upheaval, as much as by 
courtly struggles between aristocratic factions. In 1449, amidst accusations 
of lese-majesty and of favouring his own, Pedro would meet a bitter end 
in the field of battle, at the hands of his young nephew, King Afonso V, 
seemingly manipulated by an influential clique of enemies to the regent. This 
paper will examine Pedro of Coimbra and some of the men surrounding him 
during his political career (c. 1416 to 1449), in particular those employed as 
«diplomats» in foreign service. It will trace three different stages in Pedro’s 
trajectory — as a prince in the making, as the king’s counsellor, and finally 
as regent of the Portuguese kingdom — in order to question the extent to 
which a leading magnate of the fifteenth century was able to project his 
political influence in tandem with, or in reaction to, royal power. Ultimately, 
the paper highlights the co-existence, and indeed the overlap, between royal 
and non-royal diplomatic ambitions and the strains and challenges that it 
caused in the politics and diplomacy of Portugal in this period.
Keywords: Diplomacy; Political culture; Aristocracy; Medieval Portugal; 
Sovereignty.
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ARTICLE
Pedro of Avis has unanimously been considered a determined and able 
politician, whose public responsibilities gradually became associated with his 
dynasty’s projection abroad. The second surviving son of João I of Portugal 
and his queen, Philippa of Lancaster, he was knighted and made duke of 
Coimbra at the age of twenty-two in 1415, in the wake of the Portuguese 
conquest of Ceuta. Second in the line to the throne, Pedro’s political role 
spread increasingly throughout the successive reigns of three close relatives: 
that of his father, João, of his eldest brother, Duarte, and finally of his nephew 
Afonso V. During Afonso’s minority, Pedro would rise to regent of the realm, 
a position he occupied for a period of approximately ten years starting in late 
14381. Pedro’s governance and swelling political power as the head of the royal 
council, while acting on behalf of young Afonso, are known to have attracted 
resentment from competing magnates within the Portuguese court. Amidst 
allegations of lese-majesty and of favouring his own, Pedro would meet a 
bitter end in the field of battle in spring 1449 at the hands of his detractors, 
who had apparently manipulated the king into disowning the regent. The 
majority of Pedro’s court followers and civil servants, previously employed in 
the regency’s administration, were subsequently banned from royal service. 
Pedro of Coimbra’s political ascendancy was indeed noteworthy, but the 
degree of his intervention in diplomacy is, I think, to be especially singled 
out. As will be seen, his bearing on Portuguese diplomatic transactions was 
1 BARREIRA, C.F, and SEIXAS, M.M. (eds), D. Duarte e a sua época. Arte, cultura, poder 
e espiritualidade, Lisbon, 2014, GOMES, S.A., D. Afonso V, Rio de Mouro, 2005, and 
MORENO, H.B., and FREITAS, I.V. de, A corte de Afonso V: O tempo e os homens, Gijón, 
2006, are helpful in framing the courtly and political settings of Pedro of Coimbra’s 
career. More specific monographies on Pedro include: CORREIA, M.S., As viagens do 
Infante D. Pedro, Lisbon, 2000; GONÇALVES, J., O Infante D. Pedro, as «Sete Partidas» 
e a génese dos Descobrimentos, Lisbon, 1955; LIMA, D.M.X. de, O Infante D. Pedro e 
as alianças externas de Portugal (1425–1449) (unpublished MA dissertation), Niterói, 
Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2012; MARQUES, A.P., A maldição da memória 
do Infante Dom Pedro e as origens dos Descobrimentos portugueses, Figueira da Foz, 
1994; MORENO, H.B., A Batalha de Alfarrobeira: Antecedentes e significado histórico, 
Lourenço Marques, 1973 (offprint of Revista de Ciências do Homem da Universidade 
de Lourenço Marques, 2nd series, vol. 4); MORENO, H.B., O Infante D. Pedro, duque de 
Coimbra, Porto, 1997; and SCARLATTI, L., Os Homens de Alfarrobeira, Lisbon, 1980, 
complemented by Biblos, 69 (1993), a special issue collecting the Actas do congresso 
comemorativo do 6.o centenário do Infante D. Pedro: 25 a 27 de Novembro de 1992. The 
most insightful English overview of the regency is probably SOUSA, A. de, «The Ibe-
rian Peninsula: Portugal», in ALLMAND, C. (ed.), New Cambridge Medieval History, 
vol. 7 [c.1415–c.1500], Cambridge, 1998, pp. 627–44, complemented by ROGERS, 
F.M., The Travels of the Infante Dom Pedro of Portugal, Cambridge (MA), 1961.
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considerable, as it was consistently present even before the period of his 
regency. 
It is the aim of this article to think about the nature of political 
representation in late medieval diplomacy in view of the part played in 
Portuguese diplomatic exchanges by the duke of Coimbra and his entourage 
during the first half of the fifteenth century. Some limitations to this 
approach exist, however, and they need highlighting. Even when referring to 
as relatively recent a context as this, the term «national» can be misleading. 
It can perhaps be made sense of collectively, around the already discernible 
state structures of most European polities alongside the agendas adopted 
by sovereign governments, and monarchies in particular (Portugal clearly 
among them)2. Caution is also needed when considering «public» versus 
«private» spheres of political action, with whatever boundaries may have 
existed between the two. For our purposes, the former will be taken simply 
to mean a policy enacted in the interests of the common good — which is to 
say, by sovereign order on the consultation or advice of other political actors, 
as long as communally sanctioned — and the means and the agents used to 
carry it through. Such was the guiding principle of royal governance shared 
by all the better-established monarchies of the later middle ages, with the 
king — according to thinkers like Nicole Oresme — standing as «the most 
public person» in the kingdom3. But it should equally be said that as we 
know increasingly more about the circumstances surrounding the diplomatic 
interventions of actors beyond central power, be they local governments, 
wealthy burgesses (single-handedly or in coalition), or indeed, the high-born 
like Pedro of Coimbra, it too becomes clearer that for this period the private/
public divide is an ambivalent, even factitious, one to an extent; too clean-cut 
a distinction would be doubtful and unlikely to hold ground4.
2 Recently, FREITAS, J.A.G. de, O Estado em Portugal (séculos XII–XV): Modernidades 
medievais, Lisbon, 2011, pp. 40–41, but consider the remarks in BLOCKMANS, W., 
«Citizens and their Rulers», in BLOCKMANS, W., HOLENSTEIN, A., and MATHIEU, 
J. (with SCHLÄPPI, D.) (eds.), Empowering Interactions: Political Cultures and the 
Emergence of the State in Europe, 1300–1900, Aldershot, 2009, pp. 281–291, especially 
from p. 284 onwards.
3 Cited in HARDING, A., Medieval Law and the Foundations of the State, Oxford and 
New York, 2002, p. 274. 
4 For instance, see the comments in HAMILTON, K., and LANGHORNE, R., The Prac-
tice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Practice, London and New York, 2011, 
p. 31 ff., and PÉQUIGNOT, S., «Europäische Diplomatie im Spätmittelalter: Ein 
historiographischer Überblick», Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, 39/1 (2012), pp. 
65–95 (p. 76), besides a growing repertoire of more closely directed studies, some 
of which (dealing mostly with northern Europe and commercial diplomacy) can be 
mentioned for their contribution to aspects of this discussion: FUDGE, J.D., Cargoes, 
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In turn, even if this was not yet the period to be speaking of fully 
professional «diplomats» in general (and indeed of «diplomacy» in the 
modern understanding of the word), it should not be taken to mean that 
the agents of external representation and negotiation lacked preparation or 
direction. Far from it, a great many of them were perfectly and individually 
skilled, an indication of the growing subtlety by which relationships 
between foreign entities were sustained5. As will become apparent, the 
men in Pedro of Coimbra’s seigneurial affinity were often to be found in 
diplomatic employment, but not always do they seem to be acting primarily 
on the duke’s private business. In fact, a number of his followers appear 
at times to have been engaged in diplomacy as the representatives of the 
Portuguese king. This poses an important question for any discussion on 
the conception and the operational aspect of diplomacy as part and parcel of 
the governmental structures of the later middle ages: how «royal», after all, 
were royal diplomacies, in some cases at least? What follows suggests that 
the rationale behind royal diplomacy-making did not necessarily have to 
pivot around a well-defined pool of servants in the king’s orbit and therefore 
directly in the regnal state’s employment. On the contrary, resources drawn 
from both sovereign and non-sovereign powers could be, and indeed were, 
used variously to advance either national or private agendas — and quite 
likely they were used also to advance both kinds of interests concurrently.
Pedro of Coimbra is one such case of involvement in diplomacy at the 
baronial as well as the regnal level, and this matter will be considered by 
looking at the role that he and his entourage played in diplomatic exchanges 
consecutively across three periods. The first period, up to 1428, comprises 
Embargoes and Emissaries: The Commercial and Political Interaction of England and 
the German Hanse, 1450–1510, Toronto and London, 1995; HUFFMAN, J.P., The So-
cial Politics of Medieval Diplomacy. Anglo-German Relations (1066–1307), Ann Arbor, 
2000; JENKS, S., England, die Hanse und Preußen. Handel und Diplomatie, 1377–1474, 
Cologne and Vienna, 3 vols, 1992 (vol. 2); LLOYD, T.H., England and the German 
Hanse, 1157–1611: A Study of their Trade and Commercial Diplomacy, Cambridge, 1991; 
along with the essays, by Michel Bochaca, Louis Sicking, and others, included in 
SOLÓRZANO TELECHEA, J., ARÍZAGA BOLUMBURU, B., and SICKING, L. (eds.), 
Diplomacia, comercio y navegación entre las ciudades medievales de la Europa atlántica, 
Logroño (forthcoming this year).
5 PÉQUIGNOT, «Europäische Diplomatie»; LAZZARINI, I., «Renaissance Diplomacy», 
in GAMBERINI, A., and LAZZARINI, I., The Italian Renaissance State, Cambridge, 
2012, pp. 425–443 (pp. 430–432); and the levelling remarks of Riccardo Fubini on 
«the marked spirit of professionalism displayed by diplomats» in Florence and else-
where in Italy: FUBINI, R., «Diplomacy and Government in the Italian City-States of 
the Fifteenth Century (Florence and Venice)», in FRIGO, D., Politics and Diplomacy 
in Early Modern Italy (transl. A. Belton), Cambridge, 2000, pp. 25-48 (p. 26).
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Pedro’s initial forays into political administration and representation abroad; 
the decade between 1428 and 1438 corresponds to a time when his public 
role was confined to membership of the royal council; and the years 1438–
1449, during most of which Pedro exerted royal prerogative as regent for 
Afonso V. Each phase may be examined separately according to one varying 
element, Pedro’s changing situation in the polity.
ASPIRING POLITICIAN 
Pedro was personally engaged in diplomatic activity from a relatively early 
stage in his career. At about twenty-three years of age, he was represented 
at the council of Constance by his household administrator (governador*), 
Álvaro Gonçalves de Ataíde6. This capitalised on the exploits of the recent 
Portuguese crusading and the role that the prince and his siblings, the other 
infantes, played in it7. Pedro’s legation to Constance created much interest, as 
in 1418 King Sigismund, later Roman emperor, offered Pedro the march of 
Treviso, in the region of Veneto, topped with 20,000 ducats annually were 
he to claim it in person8. The infante’s own literary production shows his 
interest in the theoretical side of politics, and it is possible that he may have 
deliberately studied in preparation for what would become his grand tour 
of Europe, between 1425 and 14289. This started in England, where on 9 
December 1425 he commemorated his thirty-third birthday, and took him to 
Burgundy, possibly Denmark, the Germanic lands, and Wallachia, from where 
6 MARQUES, A maldição da memória, p. 530.
7 CRUZ, A., «Como El-Rey emuiou noteficar ho boom aqueeçimento da conquista 
de Ceuta», in Laços Históricos-Militares Luso-Magrebinos. Perspectivas de Valorização 
[V.A.], Lisbon, 2002, pp. 79–91.
8 ROGERS, The Travels of the Infante, pp. 9–16, argued that it was the knight-poet 
Oswald von Wolkenstein, who was among the Ceuta crusaders in 1415, who establi-
shed the connection between the two men.
9 Yet, there is no sound evidence that «Pedro must have followed European politics 
very closely, especially Sigismund’s relations with Venice and Bohemia» (ROGERS, The 
Travels of the Infante, p. 22). On Pedro’s writings see among others SIMÕES, M., «Os 
textos didácticos da “Geração de Avis”», in CASTRO, F.L. de, História da Literatura Por-
tuguesa. Vol. 1: Das origens ao Cancioneiro Geral, Lisbon, 2001, pp. 389–410, BUESCU, 
A.I., «Livros e livrarias de reis e de príncipes entre os séculos XV e XVI. Algumas 
notas», eHumanista, 8 (2007), pp. 143–70, as well as SOARES, N.C., «A Virtuosa Ben-
feitoria, primeiro tratado de educação de príncipes em português», Biblos, 69 (1993), 
pp. 289–314, FONSECA, J.A. da, «A Virtuosa Benfeitoria e o pensamento político do 
Infante D. Pedro», Biblos, 69 (1993), pp. 227–250, MATOS, M.C. de, «O Infante D. 
Pedro, a versão do De officiis e outras preocupações ciceronianas no Ocidente Europeu 
no século XV», Biblos, 69 (1993), pp. 315–341, and OSÓRIO, J.A., «A prosa do Infante 
D. Pedro. A propósito do Livro dos Ofícios», Biblos, 69 (1993), pp. 107–127.
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he, alongside Sigismund, fought the Turks over the next two years. Pedro’s 
slow return, calling at Rome to see Pope Martin V, covered several Italian 
cities, the Crown of Aragon (marrying Elisabet d’Urgell, the heiress of Jaume 
II, count of Urgell and once the governor general of Aragon), and Castile10.
The heavy financial investment in this journey, demonstrated by a later 
computation from the Portuguese fazenda (the royal exchequer), compiled c. 
1473, reinforces the idea of Pedro’s voyage, which was paid certainly in part 
by the crown, being a carefully planned affair11. There can be little doubt as 
to its objectives being political12. All of those hosting the duke’s entourage 
were either existing political and/or economic partners of the Portuguese, or 
in the position of strengthening relations. «The son of the king of Portugal», 
as he is referred to in most contemporary accounts, had entered into direct 
contact with these partners, Europe’s main powers, and become personally 
acquainted with their leaders. It cannot be an accident that this Portuguese 
convoy took an Atlantic rather than a Mediterranean route. One might have 
expected Pedro and his company to pay their respects to the pontiff at the 
earliest possible moment in their trip, especially since they all were men 
going on crusade, and therefore in a position to receive indulgences. Yet, 
rather than taking the shortest way to the papal curia, Pedro’s first stop was 
England, followed by Burgundy, while steering clear of territories belonging 
to the French crown, echoing the political divide which the Hundred Years’ 
War had imposed. It looks as though it was necessary for Pedro to test the 
waters diplomatically, by initially paying compliments to Portugal’s prime 
political and economic partners, in order to set the tone for the rest of the 
trip — a trip that deserves to be considered a focal event in explaining the 
outreach of some of Pedro and his diplomatic network’s later political moves.
ROYAL ADVISER
For ten years after his return, it was a well-acquainted and widely-travelled 
Pedro who served in the royal council, advising the Portuguese kings — 
10 I follow the account in ROGERS, The Travels of the Infante Dom Pedro (ch. 3), by far 
the most complete concerning Pedro’s political journey.
11 Several sixteenth-century copies of this document survive, with minor differences 
(for example, Lisbon, Biblioteca da Ajuda MS. 50-V-20, ff. 138–39 v.); see also FARO, 
J., Receitas e despesas da fazenda real de 1384 a 1481 (Subsídios documentais), Lisbon, 
1965, p. 67. For criticism, MARQUES, A.H.O., Portugal na crise dos séculos xiv e xv, 
Lisbon, 1987, p 329, n. 3.
12 For conflicting interpretations of Pedro’s voyage, see ANDRADE, A.A.B. de, Mundos 
novos do Mundo: Panorama da difusão, pela Europa, de notícias dos Descobrimentos 
geográficos portugueses, vol.1, Lisbon, 1972, pp. 17–22. 
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firstly, João I and his deputy-in-chief, João’s eldest son Duarte, and from 
1433 the latter alone. It was during this period and until 1433, that most 
crown affairs were managed by the royal heir, who, according to a recent 
biographer, despite intervening in a legislative capacity, seems not to have 
acted so much as a political leader. Instead, Duarte’s knee was bent before 
João I’s auctoritas, since the king kept his lucidity until late in life13. For 
these reasons, it is not easy to tell who exactly was behind the royal wheel 
in the late 1420s and early 1430s. Besides it has been suggested that political 
differences separated Pedro and his father, with historians arguing that before 
departing to Europe in 1425 Pedro had been disillusioned by the conduct of 
government14. Duarte, however, was interested in his brother’s opinions, as 
is shown by the correspondence exchanged between the two during Pedro’s 
journey. Pedro’s conceptions of governance, expounded in his moral and 
political treatise A Virtuosa Benfeitoria, were clear15. As Rita Costa Gomes 
has put it, these were a «defence of a social cohesion obtained through the 
circulation of gifts and of the ideal of a royal freedom released from the 
formal obligation of quid pro quo»16. The fact that Pedro believed strongly 
that the managing of clientele and personal connections were key political 
tools is significant, and it will help us frame the activities of his personnel. 
Pedro of Coimbra liaised with important personages about Portuguese 
matters even before his return to Portugal. In August 1427, when he was 
with Sigismund on crusade in Wallachia, Alfons V of Aragon (whom Pedro 
was soon to meet in person in Valencia) sought his favour in recommending 
to Sigismund the services of the Aragonese chamberlain. Alfons also wished 
to inform Pedro of his sister’s engagement to Pedro’s brother Duarte17. This 
might suggest Pedro’s prior involvement in these talks. About one year later, 
the duke surfaced in Anglo-Portuguese royal affairs, once again discreetly. A 
hitherto unknown document from the English exchequer, dating from July 
1428, registers that «mounte Maior herauld nadgairs a nous [fut] envoiee 
13 By 1415 Duarte had been given charge of most aspects of governance: DUARTE, L.M., 
D. Duarte: Requiem por um Rei Triste, Rio de Mouro, 2005, chs 5–7 (especially pp. 
49, 62–6) expresses the difficulties posed by limited evidence existing from the long 
period of Duarte’s housekeeping.
14 DUARTE, D. Duarte, pp. 79, 86, 117.
15 These included reformist ideas inspired by foreign institutions such as the University 
of Oxford and the guilds in Bruges: see King Duarte’s Leal Conselheiro, in PIEL, J.M. 
(ed.), Lisbon, 1942, ch. 14.
16 GOMES, R.C., The Making of a Court Society: Kings and Nobles in Late Medieval Por-
tugal (transl. A. Aiken), Cambridge, 2003, p. 425.
17 ALMEIDA, M.L. de, BROCHADO, I.F.C., and DINIS, A.J.D. (eds), Monumenta 
Henricina, vol. 3 [1421–1431], Coimbra, 1961, p. 163.
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depar nostre treschier et tresame frere le roy de Portugale en soun message», 
for which this herald was to be rewarded18. Although he is designated as 
the carrier of letters from the king of Portugal, we can safely assume that 
this messenger was Pedro’s servant. King João I’s own heralds were typically 
named after towns directly under the crown, such as «Lisboa»; the name 
«mounte Maior» certainly referring to one of Pedro’s greatest lordships, the 
town of Montemor-o-Velho19. A princely, rather than a royal (which is to say, 
a non-private), herald had thus been chosen for this mission. Montemor had 
been sent with royal business for João, but either Pedro, who was still on 
his European journey, interfered directly or the Portuguese crown chose to 
capitalise on the links which had been established at Henry VI’s court by him 
previously. These ties are further emphasised by documentary references, 
within the month, to the recent installation as a Garter knight of the «duc de 
Quymbre»20. Montemor Herald would also feature in Portuguese exchanges 
with Burgundy. While in 1435 he appears in the Burgundian sources clearly 
in Pedro’s command, three years later he would be called «Montmajour, 
herault du roy de Portugal», which only accentuates the dichotomy — or 
perhaps better said, the fuzziness — between the representation of sovereign 
and non-sovereign princely powers21.
The duke of Coimbra and his clientele also continue to appear in 
Anglo-Portuguese politics, operating within the king’s own sphere, into the 
reign of Duarte. The envoy sent in 1434 to announce Duarte’s accession, 
18 TNA, E 404/54/322.
19 For officers of arms in Portugal, LIMA, J.P.A. e, Armas de Portugal: Origem, evolução, 
significado, Lisbon, 1998, p. 143 ff., LIMA, J.P.A. e, «Oficiais de Armas em Portugal 
nos séculos XIV e XV», Genealogica & Heraldica: Actas do 17.º Congresso Internacional 
das Ciências Genealógica e Heráldica, Lisbon, 1989, pp. 309–47, and ANSWAARDEN, 
R. van, «Dois arautos e um harpista. As missões diplomáticas de D. João I à Holanda», 
História, vol. 26/27 (1980), pp. 44–59. On Pedro’s estates, the most comprehensive 
study still is COELHO, M.H.C., O Baixo Mondego nos Finais da Idade Média (Estudo 
de História Rural), 2 vols, Coimbra, 1983.
20 TNA, E 404/44/329, of 1 July (also in RYMER, T. (ed.), Foedera, conventiones, literae, 
et cujuscunque generis acta publica inter reges Angliæ et alios, 20 vols, London, 1704–
35, vol. 10, p. 405). Montemor could also be traced in England in 1420, according 
to ADAM-EVEN, P., and SÃO PAYO [Marquês de], «Études d’héraldique médiévale 
(Armoiries portugaises dans les armoriaux français du moyen-âge)», Armas e Troféus, 
2nd series (1960), pp. 46–61, p. 51, and LIMA, «Oficiais de Armas em Portugal», p. 
325.
21 PAVIOT, J. (ed.), Portugal et Bourgogne au XVe siècle (1384–1482): Recueil de documents 
extraits des archives bourguignonnes, Lisbon and Paris, 1995, pp. 253 (doc. 166), 254 
(doc. 168) and 289 (doc. 218, quoted). The exact aim of these visits remains un-
known. LIMA, «Oficiais de Armas em Portugal», p. 327, notes that Montemor had 
also called at the Burgundian court before this, in 1430.
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João Rodrigues Trigueiro, does not seem to bear any particular connection 
with Pedro22. Yet, we know that in March 1436 a certain «Lowys Dazavedo 
chivaler du royaume du Portugale» was in England, after having delivered 
letters from the Portuguese king23. His mission was far more delicate than 
Trigueiro’s had been. According to Portuguese records, in November 1435 
«Luys d’Azevedo cavaleiro da cassa do ifante Dom Pedro» was about to be 
sent to England on royal business, namely with a list of grievances presented 
by Duarte24. This «knight of the Infante Dom Pedro’s household» was also 
to procure from Henry VI his ratification of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, 
which Henry had been putting off. He was successful in obtaining this as 
well as a favourable reaction to the complaints he had presented on behalf 
of the king of Portugal. Azevedo and his kinsmen would be generously 
rewarded by writ from the English royal council25. Around the same time, 
in May 1436, orders were given to convey Garter robes to King Duarte, who 
recently had been admitted into the order. Robes were also to be sent «au 
Don Pedro, frere du dit roy»26. Azevedo’s political achievements in England 
for the Portuguese crown, as well as the consideration which he and his two 
masters were shown during a period of uncertainty in Anglo-Portuguese 
relations, demonstrate just how wise the choice of one of Pedro’s retainers as 
a royal envoy had been. Conversely, the use of Pedro’s personal network in 
diplomacy surely functioned as a means to strengthen his grip as a leading 
magnate in the Portuguese power structure. 
REGENT OF THE REALM 
We move on from a period when Pedro’s role in government had supposedly 
been confined to membership of the royal council, to a period during which 
a sovereign authority might be called upon based on his position as regent. 
Duarte’s premature death in September 1438, leaving his son and heir Afonso, 
a boy of six, produced a political crisis. Duarte’s will had specified Leonor 
of Aragon as Afonso’s tutor and regent of the realm. Parliament, however, 
decided to co-appoint Pedro in December that year. Increasing tensions and 
criticism ultimately cast the queen-mother from power, and from December 
1439 Pedro ruled Portugal as the sole regent for King Afonso V, who having 
22 He was «scutifer de domo [...] regis Portugalie et Algarbii»: RYMER, Foedera, vol. 10, 
p. 598; TNA, E 404/51/128.
23 TNA, E 404/52/220.
24 AHMCML, «Chancelaria de D. Duarte e de D. Afonso V», Liv. 2, doc. 14.
25 RYMER, Foedera, vol. 10, p. 641.
26 RYMER, Foedera, vol. 10, pp. 639–40, 641.
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come of age in January 1446 entrusted his uncle with maintaining the regency 
for longer than originally stated. The mandate would end in July 1448, 
however, as Pedro came under mounting accusations of misgovernment. 
Shortly afterwards he was banished from the royal court, only to die in battle 
defending his honour, in May 1449.
While, under Pedro’s ten-year rule, the structures of government 
in Portugal progressively became more centralised, it appears that his 
standing in England was also reinforced27. Henry VI’s own government had 
acknowledged the joint regency of Leonor and Pedro: in September 1439, the 
two signed, on behalf of Afonso V, the ratification of the treaty with England. 
But less than three months later (on 31 December), it was to Pedro alone 
that a letter was addressed from Westminster, which was meant to reinforce 
a commercial petition made on the same day to Pedro’s nephew the king, 
concerning the wellbeing of English subjects28. The regent’s political weight 
was certainly being played up in England, and this could not be clearer 
than from a mandate issued in August 1445, at the height of his rule, by the 
English government, which granted him the authority to arrange for a peace 
settlement between England and Castile, calling on the regent’s prudence, 
reason and experience. Henry VI and his council were therefore placing 
in the hands of Henry’s «cousin le regent» the fate of a highly anticipated 
treaty of perpetual friendship with Juan II of Castile. Pedro was not expected 
simply to mediate: he was to negotiate, sign, and swear the treaty on Henry’s 
behalf29.
The English government must have been fully conscious that Pedro 
was a keen supporter of the cause of Juan and his favourite, Don Álvaro 
de Luna, against the princes of Aragon. Following Castilian pleas for help, 
in May 1445 the regent’s son and constable of Portugal, also named Pedro, 
had led an army of around 2,500 into Castile. The Portuguese army missed 
the battle of Olmedo (19 May), where the Aragonese forces were defeated. 
Condestável Pedro was nonetheless met with Juan’s gratitude, withdrawing 
only in the following July or August30. The political support given by the 
27 This centralising policy is discussed most informatively in SOUSA, «The Iberian 
Peninsula: Portugal», pp. 639–40, and MORENO, H.B., «O Infante D. Pedro, da Re-
gência a Alfarrobeira», Biblos, 60 (1993), pp. 3–13 (especially pp. 9–10).
28 RYMER, Foedera, vol. 10, p. 751 (TNA, E 28/63/51: the date is mistaken in FERGU-
SON, J., English Diplomacy, 1422-1461, Oxford, 1972, p. 54, n. 4), p. 752. It is vaguely 
possible that the English government had just been informed of the decision, taken 
earlier that month, of the Portuguese cortes to appoint Pedro as the sole regent.
29 RYMER, Foedera, vol. 11, pp. 96–97.
30 MORENO, A Batalha de Alfarrobeira, pp. 224–34. The bibliography on Castilian high 
politics during Juan II is nothing but immense, but gateways into this complex topic 
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Portuguese regency to the Castilian monarchy had direct, positive impact on 
Anglo-Castilian relations31. 
It certainly is no coincidence that on exactly the same day the English 
issued the regent of Portugal with their mandate to sign an agreement with 
Castile, Álvaro Vasques de Almada, the most outstanding of Pedro’s followers, 
was granted an annuity from the English exchequer. It is impressive that 
this award, worth one hundred marks per year, should be given to Álvaro 
on top of his being made count of Avranches (Normandy), and in addition 
to his elevation into the Order of the Garter32. English patronage of this 
individual at this time (it was probably he who carried to Portugal the 
important mandate from Henry VI) was certainly aimed at flattering Pedro, 
with internal struggles in Castile under control — and Pedro enjoying added 
influence on the Castilian government, thanks to which he was also in a 
position to intercede for the English. 
But Álvaro Vasques de Almada was not alone among the regent’s 
affinity in becoming involved in external politics. We know that Pedro 
dealt out public offices in Portugal extensively to his followers33; it is only 
natural that his political and diplomatic networks abroad were similarly 
expanded. Following what had become standard practice in fifteenth-
century Europe, he seems to have relied heavily on officers of arms, just 
like Montemor Herald, to act as diplomatic agents. By now, heralds and 
other officers of arms had become specialists in public relations, besides 
enjoying additional safety and immunity from their rank, which made them 
particularly appropriate for diplomatic tasks34. Famously, William Bruges, 
are PORRAS ARBOLEDAS, P.A., Juan II, rey de Castilla y León (1406–1454), Gijón, 2009, 
SUÁREZ FERNÁNDEZ, L, Nobleza y monarquía: entendimiento y rivalidad. El proceso 
de construcción de la Corona española, Madrid, 2003, or, in English, ROUND, N., The 
Greatest Man Uncrowned: A Study of the Fall of Don Alvaro de Luna, London, 1986. 
31 These interconnections are addressed in GOODMAN, A., and MORGAN, D., «The 
Yorkist Claim to the Throne of Castile», Journal of Medieval History, 11 (1985), pp. 
61–9 (pp. 65–66).
32 RYMER, Foedera, vol. 11, pp. 95–96; TNA, E 404/61/271. On his nomination to the 
order, BELTZ, G.F., Memorials of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, from its Foundation 
to the Present Time, London, 1841, p. clx.
33 MORENO, A Batalha de Alfarrobeira, pp. 264–319.
34 Current scholarship has been particularly keen to highlight this: see the essays collected 
in SCHNERB, B., Le héraut, figure européene (XIVe-XVIe siècle) [special issue of Revue du 
Nord, vol. 88, (nrs 366–367)], 2006, now updated by BOCK, N., «Herolde im Reich des 
späten Mittelalters. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven», Francia — Forschungen zur 
westeuropäischen Geschichte, vol. 37 (2010), pp. 259–82, and HILTMANN, T., «Herolde 
und die Kommunikation zwischen den Höfen in Europa (14. bis 16. Jahrhundert)», 
in PARAVICINI, W., and WETTLAUFER, J., Vorbild–Austausch–Konkurrenz: Höfe und 
Residenzen in der gegenseitigen Wahrnehmung, Ostfildern, 2010, pp. 37–63.
Diplomacy in the Fifteenth-Century Monarchical State: A Baronial Pursuit? (Portugal, 1416-1449)
ANALES DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE ALICANTE. HISTORIA MEDIEVAL, N.º 19,
(2015-2016) (pp. 327-342) I.S.S.N.: 0212-2480
339
perhaps «the first herald to specialize in diplomatic work», was employed 
regularly, from Brittany to Italy, from Scotland to the Iberian Peninsula, 
often as the principal agent35. Notwithstanding Pedro’s attraction for all 
things chivalrous and the fact that the employment of heralds in diplomacy 
had now become generalised, it seems probable that he elected to use 
officers of arms principaly because of their growing professionalisation 
in diplomacy in the state’s service — which distinguished them from 
gentlefolk, merchants, or scholars, who were often drawn from «mixed» 
environments and who might perhaps escape governmental control more 
easily36. Pedro’s style of governance, in which a skilled and loyal ducal 
clientele was used to reinforce the central power of the state, may also 
have been projected in how he chose to conduct his external affairs: 
heralds were bound to him, as magnate, through personal affinity, and to 
him, as statesman, from the functions they were made to perform. Some 
examples can be cited in this regard.
In autumn 1444, Bruges, the Garter King of Arms, was sent to Aragon and 
Portugal in order to deliver Garter robes respectively to King Alfons V and 
Infante Henrique37. His partner on this voyage was a Portuguese pursuivant, 
whom the sources name «Balence». Balence could hardly stand for anything 
other than «balança», the Portuguese word for scales. The scales were Pedro’s 
personal badge, which he is known to have used in official transactions. In 
1440, he detailed which seals should be taken as authentic in documents 
issued in his name, among them a signet ring consisting of his device of the 
scales38. It was thus «Passavante Balança», as he would have been known in 
his homeland, whom we find in England in 1444, presumably at the regent’s 
service. Such was the last of several recorded visits he made to the English 
35 LONDON, H.S., The Life of William Bruges, the First Garter King of Arms, London, 
1970, pp. 20–2 (and examples in Appendix 1); FERGUSON, English Diplomacy, pp. 
189, 196.
36 Neither to be forgotten were each herald’s individual qualities, as noted in MATTINGLY, 
G., Renaissance Diplomacy, London, 1963, p. 32. For Pedro’s chivalry, FARIA, T.V. 
de, «Pela “Santa Garrotea”: Ofício cavaleiresco nas vésperas de Alfarrobeira», XIV 
Colóquio de História Militar: Portugal e os Conflitos Militares Internacionais (Lisboa, 
22-25 Nov. 2004). Actas [V.A.], vol. 2, Lisbon, 2005, pp. 61–86.
37 LONDON, H.S., The Life of William Bruges, p. 22, citing «R.G. I, 338». I was unable 
to consult this source.
38 Cited in COELHO, M.H.C., «O Infante D. Pedro, Duque de Coimbra», Biblos, 69 
(1993), pp. 15–57, pp. 51–2, n. 157. On Pedro’s badge, AVELAR, H. de, and TÁVORA, 
F., «As Empresas dos Príncipes da Casa de Avis», XVII Exposição Europeia de Arte, 
Ciência e Cultura. Os Descobrimentos Portugueses e a Europa do Renascimento. Convento 
da Madre de Deus — Catálogo, Lisbon, 1983, pp. 227–33, p. 228.
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court, all in successive years between 1442 and 144439. This suggests that 
Balança may well have been the most travelled among Portuguese diplomatic 
envoys during the regency period, certainly to England but very likely 
elsewhere too. He seems to have moved over to dealing mostly with the 
Duchy of Burgundy, where he could be found in 1446 and 1449, on both 
occasions as the «poursuivant d’armes de l’infant dom Pierre de Portugal», 
and possibly also in 144740. It remains to be confirmed whether another 
character, Pursuivant Désir — his title being the same as Pedro’s personal 
motto, which complemented his device of the scales — sided with Balança 
as a representative of the infante (or was it the regent) to the duchy. Désir is 
recorded as having been there in 144641.
Prince Pedro’s personal servants were sent off on governmental missions 
every so often. But whichever boundaries still stood between the public and 
the private remits become all the more confused since Pedro seems also to 
have used royal heralds on his own account, namely at a time when his 
political power in Portugal had started to wane. The two highest-ranking 
Portuguese officers of arms were both sent on missions by him: Rei-de-Armas 
Portugal in 1445 and Algarve in 144842. The latter had certainly been trusted 
«with divers erandes frome oure righte trusty and righte welbeloved cousin 
Pe[dro] regent of Portugale and hath entendid here upon us for his answere 
a longe tyme to his charge and grete coste». It was uncommon for a king of 
arms to be identified in official sources as an emissary from a regent figure 
instead of the nominal sovereign ruler, and it is plausible that the reason the 
English answer would come in so late had to do with the fact that, since 
about 1446, Pedro’s position in Portugal had grown significantly weaker. 
Besides, even a national office, so to speak, such as that of king of arms 
might be politicised, and it is not impossible that Rei-de-Armas Algarve was 
a supporter of Pedro at a particular level. He, for example, received from 
the regent generous grants of land in 1441 and again in 144243. It does not 
39 He was twice rewarded and about to leave the country, in July 1442 and October 1443: 
TNA, E 403/745, m. 12, E 404/60/64.
40 PAVIOT, Portugal et Bourgogne, pp. 367 (doc. 285) and 376 (doc. 300), both misread 
for «Valença»; LIMA «Oficiais de Armas em Portugal», pp. 330–31.
41 PAVIOT, Portugal et Bourgogne, p. 365 (doc. 282). LIMA, J.P.A, and SANTOS, M.A.P., 
«Quem foi Gonçalo Caldeira: testemunhos para uma análise de funções políticas na 
corte portuguesa quatrocentista — de D. João I a D. Afonso V», Revista da Faculdade 
de Letras —Ciências e Técnicas do Património, 2 (2003), pp. 335–46 (pp. 343–44).
42 LIMA «Oficiais de Armas em Portugal», p. 330; TNA, E 404/64/229. An unspecified 
officer of arms was used in 1446 (TNA, E 403/772, m. 4).
43 According to NORTON, M.A., A Heráldica em Portugal. Vol. 1: Raízes, simbologias e 
expressões histórico-culturais, Lisbon, 2004, p. 165; and see TT, «Chancelaria de D. 
Afonso V», Liv. 23, f. 59.
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seem out of place to suggest that Pedro was using the crown’s officers of 
arms who were simultaneously his partisans to make a point of his control 
over government. If Algarve had indeed been charged with finding support 
for the regency in England in 1448, his achievements proved insufficient: 
Pedro soon fell victim to the contestation roaring at court and was ushered 
away from office.
CONCLUSION
Further investigation, particularly of a comparative nature, on the logic 
and implementation of diplomacy across medieval Europe would help 
clarify matters in areas where the available documentation for Portugal 
is too scarce. There is still work to be done on the issue of conflicting 
jurisdictions between masters, and therefore of having to determine the legal, 
and indeed political, responsibilities in mixed diplomatic environments such 
as that discussed. We also need to know more about the exact conditions 
of service of those purpose-trained, highly-specialised officials attached 
to the crown service during this period — for instance, whether people 
like the experienced officers of arms used in royal diplomacy were able, or 
even expected, to continue serving throughout successive, and sometimes 
dramatically opposed, political regimes. Had someone like the Algarve King 
of Arms (whose personal identity, as with that of most medieval heralds, 
remains concealed) kept their post after the painstaking eradication of Pedro 
of Coimbra’s affinity from public office in the late 1440s, it might have told 
us something of the rationale behind the running of state institutions and 
the employment of the skilled non-privileged. 
These reservations notwithstanding, several conclusions can be drawn 
from the foregoing analysis. The activities of Infante Pedro amount to a 
vigorous and politically influential dynamic in Portuguese diplomacy over 
several decades. It was the duke and his network who effectively handled 
much of the diplomatic traffic between the crown and its most prominent 
neighbours, clearly the more so after the European expedition of 1425–28. It 
is difficult to tell exactly how much of this reflected Pedro’s personal policy 
and how much of it was aligned with the policies of Pedro’s father João I, or 
his brother Duarte, and indeed the royal council during Pedro’s own regency. 
Be this as it may, in all likelihood royal diplomacy in Portugal was regarded 
as something to be handed down for the non-ruling (partly) to manage. The 
extent to which the same could be said of other late medieval states and 
their approach to external relations would be well worth exploring: it cannot 
be stressed enough that the leading forces at the front of polities were not 
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monolithic as far as diplomacy was concerned. Even in a state as centralised 
as fifteenth-century Portugal diplomacy allowed for a diffusion of power, both 
in how such power was apparently conceived of and the people exercising 
it in practice. The case of Pedro of Coimbra shows just how problematic 
this type of influence on royal foreign policy by a princely figure might be, 
especially if the specific interests at stake diverged from those of the crown 
or the community of the realm (for example, the regency’s Castilian policy 
was hotly contested, and Portuguese relations with the English clearly lost 
force after Pedro’s final defeat in 1449). 
What is more, the actions of the duke of Coimbra as he fulfilled various 
roles in succession within the polity, taken together with the activity of the 
agents being used along the way, indicate the presence of a network of people 
that operated politically at the intersection of aristocratic and royal service. 
There remains no doubt that many of the agents more deeply involved in 
Portuguese royal diplomacy over the first half of the fifteenth century were 
at the same time the active members of a princely household — one which, 
to all intents and purposes, was separate from the king’s. Drawn variously 
from the royal and the ducal courts, these men were therefore connected, 
sometimes concurrently, to the service of the crown and to the service of a 
non-sovereign princely power, with variable degrees of interaction existing 
between the two. These diplomatic agents, moreover, were pliable enough to 
operate in several political arenas, just like Montemor Herald did in Burgundy 
and England, on behalf of the king of Portugal as much as on behalf of his 
immediate lord. They demonstrate how useful officials in positions like 
theirs might have been at reinforcing royal politics, as much as they were 
key in propping up the interests of those with whom they were most closely 
affiliated. This argues strongly for the existence of what might be termed a 
diplomatic sub-system operating in tandem with royal government, whose 
real dimension is difficult to determine but whose actions had a direct and 
observable impact on the policy-making process. Such a system would have 
stood partly as one component of inter-state relations, while enjoying relative 
autonomy, as it relied on private or semi-private clienteles and networks.
